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Abstract

Over the past decade, the collection of data by individuals, businesses and government
agencies has increased tremendously. Due to the widespread of mobile computing and
the advances in location-acquisition techniques, an immense amount of data concerning
the mobility of moving objects have been generated. The movement data of an object
(e.g. individual) might include specific information about the locations it visited, the time
those locations were visited, or both. While it is beneficial to share data for the purpose
of mining and analysis, data sharing might risk the privacy of the individuals involved
in the data. Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) provides techniques that utilize
several privacy models for the purpose of publishing useful information while preserving
data privacy.
The objective of this thesis is to answer the following question: How can a data owner
publish trajectory data while simultaneously safeguarding the privacy of the data and maintaining its usefulness? We propose an algorithm for anonymizing and publishing trajectory
data that ensures the output is differentially-private while maintaining high utility and
scalability. Our solution comprises a twofold approach. First, we generalize trajectories by
generalizing and then partitioning the timestamps at each location in a differentially-private
manner. Next, we add noise to the real count of the generalized trajectories according to
the given privacy budget to enforce differential privacy. As a result, our approach achieves
an overall -differential privacy on the output trajectory data. We perform experimental
evaluation on real-life data, and demonstrate that our proposed approach can effectively
answer count and range queries, as well as mining frequent sequential patterns. We also
vi

show that our algorithm is efficient w.r.t. privacy budget and number of partitions, and also
scalable with increasing data size.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation

Over the past decade, the collection of data by individuals, businesses and government
agencies has increased tremendously. While it is beneficial to share data for the purpose of
mining and analysis, data sharing might risk the privacy of the individuals involved in the
data. Privacy-reserving data publishing (PPDP) [32] provides techniques that utilize several
privacy models for the purpose of publishing useful information while preserving data
privacy. Unlike differential privacy [25], other privacy models such as k-anonymity [94],
l-diversity [63] and t-closeness [59] do not fully protect against attacks that are based
on the prior knowledge of the adversary about individuals in data. Such attacks include
table-linkage attacks, attribute-linkage attacks, and probabilistic attacks. On the other
hand, differential privacy overcomes such attacks and makes no assumptions about the
background knowledge an adversary may have, and does not reveal the participation of
an individual in the published data [116]. In this thesis, our goal is to achieve differential
privacy guarantee on the published data.
Due to the widespread of mobile computing and the advances in location-acquisition
techniques, an immense amount of data concerning the mobility of moving objects have
been generated. The movement data of an object (e.g. individual) might include specific
information about the locations it visited, the time those locations were visited, or both. In
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general, the origin of movement data can be the mobility of either people, vehicles, animals
or natural phenomena [115]. Furthermore, movement data can be broadly classified into
sequential and trajectory data. Sequential data contains a set of sequences, where each
sequence lists in chronological order the locations visited by a moving object. On the
other hand, the movement of an object in a trajectory data is represented as a sequence of
doublets (l, t) representing the location l that was visited at timestamp t. In this thesis, we
consider the problem of publishing vehicle trajectory data.

1.2

Challenges & Concerns

While trajectory data can be used to perform several mining tasks, including trajectory
pattern mining, trajectory classification and trajectory outlier detection [115], publishing
trajectory data imposes several concerns.
A major concern is data privacy. The application of typical privacy models such
as [94][63][59] via privacy-preserving data publishing techniques on trajectory data does
not protect the published data against privacy attacks, which include:
• Background knowledge attacks, where an adversary utilizes its background knowledge about an individual in the trajectory data to infer sensitive information about
said individual.
• Probabilistic attacks, where an adversary can infer the presence or absence of an
individual’s trajectory in the published trajectory data.
Example 1.2.1 illustrates the privacy concern in trajectory data publishing.
Example 1.2.1. Let Table 1.1 represent a raw trajectory dataset which comprises of eight
trajectories, each of which is linked to a sensitive attribute. Table 1.2 represents a 2-
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Table 1.1: Raw trajectory data
Index
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T8

Trajectory
c1 → b2 → c4 → d5
b5 → d8 → a10
a2 → b3 → e5 → b7
e6 → a7 → c9
b3 → e5 → c9
e6 → a7 → c9 → d10
a1 → b2 → d4 → e5
a3 → b7 → d8

Table 1.2: 2-anonymous trajectory data based on Table 1.1
Index
Tˆ1
Tˆ2
Tˆ3
Tˆ4

Anonymous Trajectory
b3 → e5
e6 → a7 → c9
b3 → e5
e6 → a7 → c9

anonymous version of the raw data. If an adversary knows that an individual visited
location b at timestamp 3, the adversary can determine from Table 1.2 that either trajectory
Tˆ1 or trajectory Tˆ3 represents that individual. As a result, the adversary can infer with 100%
confidence that the individual visited location e at timestamp 5, given that doublet e5 exists
in both trajectories. Moreover, if the sensitive attributes associated with Tˆ1 and Tˆ3 are the
same, then the adversary can perform homogeneity attack and infer with 100% confidence
the sensitive attribute of that individual. Otherwise, it will be able to infer the sensitive
attribute with 50% confidence.



Another concern with respect to publishing trajectory data is high-dimensionality. Trajectories might consist of a long sequence of doublets, thus increasing the dimensionality
of the data. As a result, publishing trajectory data will typically produce low utility output
due to the curse of high dimensionality [23].
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Example 1.2.2. Assume that a metro system runs between 50 stations for 22 hours every
day. The number of doublets that can be possibly generated based on the possible locations
and timestamps are 50 ∗ (22 ∗ 3600) = 3, 960, 000 doublets (assuming accuracy is to the
second), which also represents the total possible dimensions in the data.



Another concern with respect to publishing trajectory data is sparseness. For example,
in a taxi trajectory data, a taxi can visit only a few locations over a period of time, which
results in the raw data being sparsely populated as each trajectory consists of a small subset
of all possible doublets. Also, a trajectory of any taxi can contain a limited number of
doublets because a taxi can be at only one location at a given time. Sparseness and high
dimensionality in raw data typically leads to reduction in size in the anonymized output
due to the suppression of trajectories, as illustrated in Example 1.2.3.
Example 1.2.3. Due to the sparsity and high dimensionality of the doublets in Table 1.1,
the 2-anonymous data in Table 1.2 contains only 4 trajectories, even though the raw data
contains 8 trajectories.



Extensive research [79][89][74][1][17][95] has been done regarding movement data
sharing while preserving the privacy of the individuals involved, mostly using differential
privacy[11][30][49][46][85]. One such research [46] for applying differential privacy to
publish trajectory data, aims to generalize the trajectories by generalizing the locations and
adding noise to the number of occurrences of trajectories to ensure differential privacy.
The approach we propose in this thesis also applies the differential privacy model and is
distinct from the previous approaches because it provides high utility for count queries,
range queries, and frequent sequential pattern mining. More specifically, in this thesis,
we propose an algorithm for anonymizing and publishing trajectory data, such that the
output is differentially-private while maintaining high utility. Our solution comprises of a
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twofold approach. In the first phase (Phase 1), we generalize trajectories by generalizing
and partitioning the timestamps at each location while guaranteeing differential privacy.
In the next phase (Phase 2), we add noise to the real count of the generalized trajectories
to ensure differential privacy. As a result, our approach achieves an overall -differential
privacy on the output trajectory data.

1.3

Thesis Statement

The objective of this thesis is to answer the following question: How can a data owner
publish its trajectory data while simultaneously safeguarding the privacy of the data
and maintaining its usefulness?
More specifically, given a trajectory dataset D = {T1 , T2 , T3 ....T|D| } and a privacy
budget , the goal of this thesis is to propose an approach for generating and publishing
an anonymized version of the data D̂ for the purpose of data mining and analysis such that:
1. The published data D̂ satisfies differential privacy.
2. The published data D̂ maintains high utility.
3. The proposed approach is efficient and scalable.

1.4

Organization of the Thesis

This Thesis is organized as follows:

• Chapter 2 discusses the background knowledge needed for a better understanding of
the terms used throughout this thesis.
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• Chapter 3 discusses the related literature over the past years in the fields related to
publishing and mining movement data and other types of data, via differential privacy
or other privacy models.
• Our algorithm for publishing trajectory data using differential privacy is proposed in
Chapter 4. We discuss in detail the proposed algorithms and how differential privacy
is achieved over different steps before the data can be published.
• Chapter 5 discusses the properties of the datasets we use to perform our experiments.
We test the performance of the proposed algorithms by measuring its scalability,
efficiency and utility over two trajectory datasets.
• We conclude the thesis in Chapter 6 with a discussion about future work.
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Chapter 2

BACKGROUND

We begin this section by a presenting an overview of movement data (trajectory and sequential), and then we introduce differential privacy as a mechanism for data anonymization.

2.1

Movement Data

Movement data represents the actual movement of an individual over a period of time. It
is essential to effectively hide the identity of the individuals in the movement data before
the data is shared. This has led to a vast amount of research in the field of movement
data publishing in general. Over the last few years, after the authors of [25] introduced
the concept of differential privacy, research has changed focus to publishing movement
data using differential privacy. Movement data is typically presented as either trajectory
or sequential data. Since our approach is designed mainly for trajectory data, we will
introduce the notations that we will be using through the rest of this thesis.

Definition 2.1.1. Trajectory. A trajectory Ti represents information about the displacements of an individual i, wherein time t is taken into account and the trajectory can be
represented as a series of doublets:

Ti = (l1 , t1 ) → (l2 , t2 ) → (l3 , t3 ) → .... → (l|Ti | , t|Ti | )

(2.1)
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where each doublet comprises of a timestamp tj and a location lj , and doublets in a
trajectory are ordered chronologically according to their timestamps.



Definition 2.1.2. Trajectory data. Trajectory data D is a set of trajectories owned by a
data owner, and represented as:

D = {T1 , T2 , T3 ....T|D| }

where each trajectory Ti represents an individual.

2.2

(2.2)



Differential Privacy

We begin this section by introducing differential privacy. We discuss the concept of sensitivity and the mechanisms that exist for achieving -differential privacy, namely exponential
mechanism and Laplace mechanism.

2.2.1 -Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [25], proposed by Cynthia Dwork, aims to achieve a strong guarantee that the presence or absence of an individual cannot be inferred when analyzing
differentially-private published data, regardless of the background of the attacker.
-differential privacy is an extension of the general idea of differential privacy, where 
is the privacy budget (privacy parameter) that controls the level of privacy provided when
differential privacy is applied to a raw dataset.
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Definition 2.2.1. -Differential Privacy [25]. A randomized function K provides -differential
privacy if for all datasets D1 and D2 differing in at most one record, and all possible outputs
S ⊆ Range(K), then:

Pr [K(D1 ) ∈ S] 6 exp () × Pr [K(D2 ) ∈ S]

where parameter  is the privacy level.

(2.3)



Note that privacy budget  affects privacy and accuracy (and therefore utility) of the
generated differentially-private data such that a lesser value of  means stronger privacy but
also poor utility.

Sensitivity
Mechanisms such as noise addition and exponential mechanism are utilized in order to
achieve differential privacy. However, the effectiveness of such mechanisms depends on
data sensitivity. Sensitivity can be informally defined as the maximum possible change
in the utility function when a single record is either removed, added, or altered. More
formally:
Definition 2.2.2. Sensitivity [25].

Given a function f : D → Rd over a domain D, the

sensitivity of f is defined as:

∆(f ) = max k f(D1 ) - f(D2 ) k
D1 ,D2

where D1 and D2 are neighboring datasets that differ in a maximum of one record.

(2.4)



Sensitivity varies depending on the type of data, which affects the utility of the output
since it is impacted by the level of noise added.
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Exponential Mechanism
McSherry and Talwar [67] proposed a technique to achieve differential privacy using exponential mechanism. Exponential mechanism determines the outcome by taking as input
the score q (U tilityeach ) generated by the utility function, the dataset D, an output range Γ
and privacy budget . The outcome is chosen with the following probability:

(U tilityeach )
exp 2∆u
PAll 
i=1 2∆u (U tilityi )

(2.5)

where ∆u is the sensitivity of the utility function.
The exponential mechanism results in the probability distribution over the output range
Γ. Sampling is done over this probability distribution in order to obtain an output. As seen

in equation 2.5, the probability of any output is directly proportional to exp 2∆u
(U tilityeach ),

which means it is directly proportional to the score value of the utility. This leads us to the
theorem 2.2.1 from [67].
Theorem 2.2.1. For any function having utility score U tility, an algorithm that chooses

(U tility) satisfies -differential
an output with probability directly proportional to exp 2∆u

privacy.



Adding Laplace Noise
Dwork et al. [25] proposed Laplace mechanism to obtain differential privacy by adding
noise. It begins by first computing the true solution to a given function over a dataset D.
The value obtained is distorted by adding to it a noise from the Laplace distribution. Given
a function f (D) where D is original data, after applying Laplace mechanism to add a noise,
the noisy value for the function is represented as follows:
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f (D0 ) = f (D) + Lap(λ)

(2.6)

where Lap(λ) represents the Laplace noise sampled from Laplace distribution having probability density function (PDF):

P r(xkλ) =

1
exp(−|x|/λ)
2λ

(2.7)

, where variance is 2λ2 centered at 0.
Theorem 2.2.2. [25] Given a function f : D → Rd , the algorithm that adds Laplace noise
with probability distribution Lap(∆f /) to each d output will always satisfy -differential
privacy.

2.2.2



(, δ)-Differential Privacy

Data can be said to be differentially-private when a participant’s data is altered (added/removed) in the considered dataset which leads to a minute change in the generated differentiallyprivate data.
For input data D to a randomized algorithm K, the random variable corresponding to
D is K(D). The probability of the event is not similar as compared to more probable
events, under the distribution K(D1 ) and K(D2 ) because the metric in differential privacy
is multiplicative.
This necessary condition for differential privacy was later relaxed in following research
and (,δ)-differential privacy is a more relaxed differential privacy model as compared to
the -differential privacy that is a stronger privacy guarantee nonetheless. (, δ)-differential
privacy is defined as :
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Definition 2.2.3. (, δ)-Differential Privacy: A randomized algorithm K is (,δ)-differentiallyprivate if for all databases D1 , D2 ∈ (D)n that varies in one individual’s records:

Pr [K(D1 ) ∈ S] 6 exp() × Pr [K(D2 ) ∈ S] + δ

, where S represents all subsets of outputs. [58].

(2.8)



Note that when δ = 0, Equation 2.8 represents -differential privacy.

2.2.3

i -Differential Privacy

The authors in [68] discuss two techniques for guaranteeing privacy in the case of multiple
data releases.

P
( i i )-Differential Privacy: When there is a sequential series of analysis (release),
each of which satisfies -differential privacy, then the sum of  values can be added to
P
P
generate ( i i )-Differential Privacy. ( i i )-Differential Privacy is also referred to as
sequential composition.
(maxi i )-Differential Privacy: In the case of maxi i )-differential privacy, unlike
sequential composition, structurally disjoint subsets of the data are analyzed. This disjoint
(parallel) subset’s sequence of analysis provides (maxi i )-differential privacy, which is
also referred to as parallel composition.

2.3

Differential Privacy Guarantee

Differential privacy, introduced in [26] is different from previous privacy definitions which
attempt to prevent data leakage and disclosure, as well as other privacy violations. Differ-
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ential privacy aims at preventing attackers from obtaining knowledge about the presence of
an individual’s records in a published data. It provides a strong guarantee that the presence
or absence of of an individual record will have no effect on the result of analysis on the
published data. In other words, the result to a query on a differentially-private dataset
will remain almost the same with the presence or absence of an individual. Essentially,
differential privacy provides  privacy guarantee such that for an appropriate  value, a
mechanism K (see Equation 2.3) satisfies the definition of differential privacy. If the input
datasets are almost identical in various randomized computations, the outcome distribution
will also be nearly identical.
The authors in [34] state that unlike previous ad-hoc guarantees that provided security
against only certain attacks, differential privacy provides an ad-omnia guarantee. Also,
since differential privacy is able to provide a rigid because it is independent of the computational power of the adversary and their knowledge of any background information [26].
This suggests that differential privacy achieves privacy over data through uncertainty, i.e.
via randomization. Therefore, it isn’t possible for any output to reveal a single individual’s
data with certainty.
Table linkage attack is possible if the data recipient is able to confidently determine
whether the individual’s record exists in the released data table. Since differential privacy
guarantees that presence or absence of an individual’s record in the original data will have
no significant effect on the generated output, this privacy model guarantees against the
possibility of a table linkage attack.
In [56], however, the authors suggest that without any knowledge or assumption about
the data, when differential privacy is applied to social networks, or when deterministic
statistics have been previously released, the privacy guarantee could possibly degrade. This
led to the development of new techniques for maintaining differential privacy guarantee in
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Figure 2.1: Interactive vs non-interactive frameworks of differential privacy.
the case of complex data publishing scenarios (see Section 3.2 for more details).

2.4

Interactive Differential Privacy

Instead of the data owner publishing its data in a differentially-private manner (non-interactive),
the data miner/analyst could pose queries directly to the data owner. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the interactive and non-interactive frameworks of differential privacy. The system could be
already aware of all the queries that will be posed by the data miner in advance and it could
take the appropriate measures to make the data private. However, in most cases (interactive
queries), the system would respond to the posed ad-hoc queries without any knowledge
of the queries or any insight into the future. Privacy-preserving query processing is the
task wherein queries posed over statistical data are answered by injecting random noise to
each of the responses to guarantee the privacy of an individual by making their presence or
absence in the data unclear. A number of techniques have been proposed for predetermined
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query processing [112][52], as well interactive query processing [70][31].
Privacy-preserving data mining is the task of mining information from a data wherein
the data owner is responsible for maintaining the privacy guarantee in the answers sent to
the data miners. A vast amount of research has proposed privacy-preserving data mining
techniques under differential privacy [31][44][2][44][82] and non-differential privacy [29].
Privacy-preserving data analysis is the set of tasks where the published or mined data is
analyzed by a set of analysis algorithms performed by data analysts, while maintaining
efficient privacy guarantees with reference to the privacy of individual’s records in the
data. A number of papers have proposed privacy-preserving data analysis techniques under
differential privacy [80][28][40][41][53][65][103][70] [69].
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Chapter 3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Below, we review the most relevant research work in the literature.

3.1

Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing

Privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) provides the tools and methods for publishing
data while preserving the privacy of the entities stored in the data, as well as maintaining
utility of the anonymized published data. Distributed privacy-preserving data publishing
(DPPDP) is a decentralized version of PPDP where multiple parties are involved in the
process of data publishing. In the literature, several privacy mechanisms including kanonymity [94], l-diversity [63], t-closeness [59] and differential privacy [25] have been
suggested to publish various types of data. However, k-anonymity and differential privacy have been the most widely utilized mechanisms for publishing movement data while
maintaining the privacy of the moving objects stored in the data.

3.1.1

via Differential Privacy

Differential privacy was introduced by Dwork et al. [25] for privacy-preserving data publication. Differential Privacy Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) can be implemented using
a number of techniques. In this section we categorize the proposed techniques based on the
type of the input data.
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Publishing Movement Data

Over the past years, there has been an extensive research for publishing movement data,
which includes trajectory and sequential data. Lately, there have also been several works
in the fields of trajectory data publishing [11][30][49][46][85], sequential data publishing [16][13][43], and trajectory and sequential data publishing [15].
An approach to publish differentially-private time series data for traffic monitoring was
proposed in [30]. The authors introduced two estimation algorithms: the first applies
posterior estimation, and for the cells onto which it was applied, a time-series quadtree
model is generated. Based on this quadtree model, the second algorithm groups similar
cells to generate spacial indexing structure and hence reduces the impact of data sparsity
on the approach. Jiang et al. [49] proposed another approach for time-series data which
applied sphere sampling with the addition of noise. They introduce an approach called
sampling distance and direction (SDD) which applies exponential mechanism for sampling
the next location to be published in a trajectory.
Another approach for publishing trajectory data was introduced in [46], which is an
improvement to the techniques proposed in [15][13]. While the previous approaches assume the trajectories have a number of common prefixes or n-grams which might not
be true for all data, the approach in [46] does not make this assumption. The authors
introduced a differentially-private location generalization algorithm which generalizes all
trajectories to merge any locations that have the same timestamps. This algorithm applies
exponential mechanism to recursively choose from the partitions of the location universe
at each timestamp, where the clustering approach that generated the partition replaces the
locations in the same cluster by their centroid. Next, they introduce another algorithm
to publish these generalized trajectories in a differentially-private manner, by generating
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new trajectories based on the generalized locations, and finally publishing the noisy counts
after the addition of Laplace noise. Riboni et al. [85] proposed a technique that integrated
differential privacy and pre-filtering process, explicitly for protecting check-in data so an
untrusted adversary is unable to infer check-in details shared by other individuals. Their
approach primarily publishes a single version of the differentially-private data by enforcing
(L, j)-density. They further extend this approach for incremental release by extracting (L,
j)-private statistics from the dataset that had previously enforced (L, j)-density. They further
apply Laplace mechanism to add Laplace noise depending on the locations visited that were
pruned. Another approach proposed by [11] introduces l-trajectory privacy where only
certain trajectories published are differentially-private, which is determined by the desired
length of the trajectory.
Chen et al. [13] acknowledged the drawback of [15] that the number sequences represented in each branch of the prefix tree reduces considerably, thus resulting in poor utility
overall. Therefore, they introduce a technique for probabilistic prediction which represents
sequential data as variable length n-grams; which is similar to (n-1)-order Markov Chain
Model. Their technique incorporates the addition of Laplace noise to achieve differential
privacy. To limit the noise added, they employ an exploration tree that performs adaptive
budget allocation and also enforces consistency constraints based on Markov assumption.
The technique suggested in [43] proposes an algorithm to synthesize GPS trajectories
(without timestamps) using hierarchal reference systems (HRS) model. The HRS captures
correlations between adjacent locations in regular trajectories and is designed for realistic
data which has large spatial domains. DPT inputs a uniformly distributed sample of the
sequence of locations (latitude-longitude pairs) and applies Laplace mechanism to add
Laplace noise and then outputs differentially-private synthetic trajectories.
The authors in [15][16] proposed a differentially-private data sanitization approach for
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trajectory data and sequential data. The proposed algorithm inputs raw trajectory data,
privacy budget  and the height of the prefix tree, and publishes the sanitized data that
satisfies -differential privacy. The noisy prefix tree P T is constructed by a function in
the sanitization algorithm by recursively grouping trajectories in the data into disjoint
subsets based on their prefix and employs a set of count queries. Another function of
the sanitization algorithm applies a utility boosting technique on PT and generates the
sanitized data in a differentially-private manner. The approach supports both count queries
and frequent sequential pattern mining.

Publishing Non-Movement Data
The authors in [72] present an -differentially-private anonymization algorithm called DiffGen that relies on generalization and specialization. Given privacy budget , /2 is assigned
to the generalization and specialization process, while the other /2 is utilized to add
Laplace noise before publishing. Taxonomy trees are used for specialization, where the
taxonomy tree represents the predefined hierarchy of the categorical attributes, whereas
for numerical attributes split points are adaptively determined. DiffGen algorithm begins
by generalizing each quasi-identifier attribute in the raw data to its topmost value in the
corresponding taxonomy tree, where a root node is created and all data records are assigned
to this node. Next, a sequence of specializations is performed where the records at the
parent node split into disjoint child nodes. Two utility functions, InfoGain and Max,
are used for determining the score of specialization of each attribute in the parent node.
Exponential mechanism utilizes the heuristic functions and a part of the privacy budget
to determine the attribute for specialization in a differentially-private manner. At each
level i, a part of the generalization and specialization budget /2 is consumed, where each
iteration at the same level in the hierarchy consumes the same privacy budget due to the
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parallel composition property. Finally, after ‘h’ number of specializations, /2 is added to
the remaining budget from the specialization steps for computing the noisy count of each
leaf node. If the noisy count is greater than or equal to the given threshold value, then those
records will be published. The authors in [71] extended the DiffGen algorithm from [72]
by designing a securely two-party protocol for publishing vertically-partitioned data while
satisfying differential privacy.
Barak et. al. [7] combined the privacy mechanism in [28] with the technique they
propose to obtain strong privacy, accuracy and consistency in the published data and hence
publish a set of marginals from the contingency table. They proposed an algorithm to
achieve privacy by applying Laplace noise to the data, which is converted to privacyprotective intermediate data. If the publisher releases this intermediate data, the privacy is
preserved. To maintain accuracy and consistency, the approach adds noise by transforming
the data to Fourier domain which encodes the data as the marginals in a non-redundant way.
Linear programming is then applied to generate a non-negative contingency table having
Fourier coefficient values and later, for integrality, the results are rounded up. Also, the
approach suggests that Fourier domain is not necessarily employed, instead, the marginals
can directly be perturbed and then linear programming can be used; but in this scenario,
the published data might not be as accurate as when Fourier domain is used. Although
their focus lies on generating and maintaining a balance between privacy, accuracy and
consistency, the proposed algorithm for obtaining differential privacy validates a balance
between obtaining privacy, accuracy and consistency.
Yang et. al. [108] extends the research of [7] through application of the technique on
a number of examples; if there is a possibility of making sensible inferences based on the
published data, the extent to which these inferences can be made. Based on the results
obtained, they conclude that the proposed technique is unsuitable for publishing large,
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sparse contingency tables. On the other hand, [104] considers application of probabilistic
inference to the measurements and measurement process of obtaining differentially-private
data. They conclude by stating that probabilistic interference and differential privacy are
complementary lines of research and application of probabilistic interference improves
accuracy, integrates multiple observations and measures uncertainty.
Hardt et. al. [42] [40] propose an algorithm – MWEM for publishing differentiallyprivate data. MWEM combines the concept of exponential mechanism with Multiplicative
Weights update rule to achieve -differential privacy by posing queries non-interactively
using exponential mechanism for selecting the best scoring result from the distribution and
Laplace mechanism for reporting measurements as approximate sums of bounded functions
and addition of Laplace noise; where sum is the result of a linear query on the dataset.
Next, multiplicative weights update rule is applied as used in [41] and [39] by continuously
improving the approximate distribution. It suggests that, if a query’s result on true data is
much greater than on approximate data, the approximating weights on the records that are
contributing positively should be increased and the approximating weights on the records
that are contributing negatively should be reduced, and vice versa if a query’s response on
true data is much less than on approximate data.
The authors of [18] present an algorithm F-BCQT (Filter-Build Consistency Quadtree)
for two-dimensional sparse data publication which boosts the accuracy of range queries on
the published data. The algorithm consists of two parts: First, two side filter algorithm
is used to compress the dataset and obtain the sampling dataset from the original twodimensional sparse dataset. Next, the incomplete quadtree is built based on the sampling
dataset, where a quadtree is such a tree data structure whose each internal node has exactly
four child nodes. The Filter algorithm hides the true location of the original dataset based
the incomplete quadtree. The second part of the algorithm compresses the data, and then
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adjust the noise under consistency between tree nodes. They employ BLUE (Best Linear
Unbiased Estimator) algorithm to adjust the values of nodes for adjusting any inconsistencies existing between father and child nodes. They further experimentally analyze the
algorithm by comparing it to the previously proposed algorithms for checking the accuracy
of range queries on the published data.
A fairly new approach to achieve differential privacy on tabular data was introduced by
[91], where they combine a technique to achieve k-anonymity privacy model with differential privacy, for enhancement of utility of published data. To reduce the Laplace noise
that is added for achieving -differential privacy, noise must be added to the k-anonymous
version of the dataset, which is achieved by micro-aggregation of all attributes. While
we consider D to be the dataset input in the algorithm, D represents the differentiallyprivate version of dataset D. To improve the utility of D , the algorithm comprises of two
steps: First, k-anonymous data set D̄ is generated from D by using micro-aggregation
like MDAV[22] with the assumption that all attributes are QI attributes (quasi-identifier).
Next, k-anonymous dataset D̄ generates -differentially-private dataset D based on the
-differentially-private response to the posed queries. The idea behind possibility of improvement in utility by using k-anonymity is that unlike when differential privacy is directly
applied for a number of individuals, this technique applies for groups. Also, the sensitivity
is considerably low when this technique is applied since each record in published dataset
D̄ depends on at least k or more records in original dataset D.
The authors of [71] proposed distributed differentially-private anonymization algorithm DistDiffGen to publish vertically partitioned data, where two publishers possess
different attributes of the same participants. The proposed approach is an extension of
DiffGen algorithm proposed by [72], with an addition of distributed exponential mechanism
for analyzing the candidate score pairs and generating the winner based on the definition of
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exponential mechanism. This winner candidate is later used for specialization. Additionally, this approach uses addition of Gaussian noise for privacy protection against the other
publisher and Laplace noise for achieving differential privacy.
In [6], the authors propose an approach to publish horizontally partitioned data, where
a part of the data is held by two publishers. They present an algorithm for obtaining the
winner candidate by applying exponential mechanism in a two-party scenario. While this
algorithm can be used as a sub-algorithm in any algorithm, they apply it on their two-party
algorithm similar to [71]. Finally, Laplace noise is added by each party for maintaining
differential privacy while exchanging data.
The paper [14] introduces an algorithm based on probabilistic top-down specialization
approach to obtain -differential privacy on set-valued data, by applying differentiallyprivate sanitization algorithm DiffPart. DiffPart performs the first step of its top-down
partitioning algorithm by performing generalization of all records iteratively till a single
root partition is reached. Further, the sub-partitions are generated recursively until leaf partition is reached, based on the taxonomy tree representation and non-empty sub-partitions
are further re-partitioned, for which either exponential or Laplace mechanisms can be employed. However, they claim that exponential mechanism leads to a smaller privacy budget
allocation for each operation since it does not consider the composition property even under
the circumstances when all sub-partitions contain disjoint datasets and this leads to less
accurate results; Therefore, the proposed mechanism uses Laplace mechanism. Finally, for
each leaf partition that is greater than a predetermined size, DiffPart adds the noisy number
of records in that partition based on its noisy size, to publish the differentially-private data.
The authors of [114] propose an algorithm–IncTDPart for incrementally publishing
a series of differentially-private datasets. The proposed technique employs Top-down
partitioning/top-down specialization (TDS) by means of taxonomy tree and update-bounded
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sanitization mechanism. The approach is similar to the TDS technique and employs DiffPart algorithm proposed by [14] for publishing static set-valued data, differing in the fact
that there exists an incremental release mechanism that has prior knowledge about the
maximum number of updates that will be permitted, making the mechanism U-bounded.
Such a scenario where data is published incrementally is further discussed in Section 3.2.
The authors of [20] discuss the problems of big data research in terms of analysis,
archiving and reusing the data and generation of results. The problems discussed include,
the fact that big data analysis needs to be performed on cloud therefore unusual expertise is
essential, also the large datasets pose an increased risk of revealing personally identifiable
information. They then discuss solutions to contain these challenges for publishing and
analysis of big data by application of differential privacy.
The paper [96] discusses the issues with publication of two-dimensional datasets using differential privacy by use of methods like construction of a hierarchy of partitions
which cannot be implemented for high dimensional datasets or by using a one or two level
equi-width grid over data domain which is not suitable for skewed datasets. They also
propose a technique as their solution to the discussed problems which uses private h-tree
which makes use of a two level tree and a data dependent method. h-tree requires less
budget for node counts since its height is deliberately kept low, which leads to more budget
being assigned for median partitioning. The paper proposes a recursive budget strategy
for minimizing the noise added, by reducing the number of median splits from linear to
logarithmic, since the splitting points are selected in a differentially-private manner. The
experimental evaluation of this approach on real-world and synthetic datasets demonstrated
that the proposed approach is better than existing approaches, especially in the case of
skewed datasets having outliers.
The authors of [107] introduce DPCube which is the component in Health Informa-
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tion DE-identification (HIDE) framework, and makes use of differentially-private access
mechanisms and two-phase multidimensional partitioning strategy for publishing multidimensional data cubes or multidimensional histograms for sensitive data. HIDE framework
is used for integrating heterogeneous structured and unstructured health information and
includes techniques for PPDP. The multidimensional data cubes and histograms published
by DPCube achieve good utility in a differentially-private manner. The paper demonstrates
that the data cubes published using DPCube is differentially-private version of the raw
dataset, and the published data can be used for On-line Analytical Processing (OLAP)
queries and learning mechanisms.
The paper [73] discusses that the existing solutions for publishing relational and setvalued data and propose an algorithm to publish it for health-care data in a differentiallyprivate manner. The proposed method differs from the existing methods by adding noise
after generalizing the records, instead of generating a contingency table for addition of
noise. The flow that the proposed technique follows is that raw data is generalized first and
next, optimal noise is added to guarantee differential privacy. Additionally, they build a
decision tree classifier from the differentially-private published dataset to demonstrate the
utility of the published data. The experimental evaluation of the technique showed that it
is scalable and has efficient performance, although the utility might be affected when the
domain size of the output is very large.

3.1.2

via Other Privacy Models

Prior to introduction of differential privacy, data publishing research primarily encompassed a number of other privacy-preserving models including k-anonymity [87][88], ldiversity [64] and t-closeness [61]. Each of these privacy models provide one or more
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privacy guarantees for the published data as detailed in [34] where each mentioned technique is explored in detail and shows each of their respective limitations.
Publishing data with k-anonymous privacy guarantee, the record of an individual is
hidden by grouping records that have the same Quasi-Identifiers, with k number of records.
There has been a lot of research on k-anonymity and can be explored in [36][35][45][77][93].
Since k-anonymity assumes that each record represents a distinct individual, it provides
little privacy to a group of k records being owned by fewer than k owners. To overcome this
issue in k-anonymity, (X,Y)-anonymity [98] was introduced. k-anonymity based privacy
models rely on formation of group, but if the records in the assigned group consist of
sensitive attributes having similar values, the adversary could perform attribute linkage
attack i.e. infer an individual’s sensitive value based on the values received from the entire
group and singling out the individual thereby eliminating privacy guarantees. To avoid
this, further research was done which gave rise to privacy-preserving models that could
potentially defend against attribute linkage.
One of the most noted of these contributions was l-diversity that guarantees every quasiidentifier group will have at lease l sensitive attributes. In [64][54][57][102], techniques
were proposed to achieve l-diversity and recursive (c,l)-diversity (an improvement over
l-diversity). l-diversity, while a significant improvement over k-anonymity, has its own
drawbacks–each sensitive attribute taking values uniformly being one of them. To avoid
this, other privacy models were proposed to prevent attribute linkage that could be achieved
even in l-diversity. These include confidence bounding [100][99], (X,Y)-privacy [98], (a,k)anonymity [105], (k,e)-anonymity [112] and t-closeness. One of the most noteworthy
of them being t-closeness, implemented by [61][92][10][84][60] which provides great
privacy guarantee in the published data. In addition to these models, other set of privacy
models were being researched on that would provide privacy guarantees in cases where
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previous models would fail. One such case would be when an attacker might not know an
individual’s record in dataset, but might confidently be able to infer the presence or absence
of an individual’s record in published data. To overcome this table linkage, techniques that
implemented privacy guarantees: δ-presence [78][76], (d,γ)-privacy [83], distributional
privacy [8] and -differential privacy [26][24][27] were employed. Additionally, to reduce
an attacker’s probabilistic belief about an individual changes once they have received access
to the published data, a number of other privacy models were implemented. [12] introduced
(c,t)-isolation privacy model, (d,γ)-privacy by [83], distributional privacy introduced by [8]
and -differential privacy by [26][24][27] were a few among said models.
[34] then discusses publishing complex data in multiple scenarios and the ongoing
research in each field. The primary research for these complex publishing scenarios can
be found in–multiple release [109][55][7], sequential release [98][88][93], continuous release [9][106][33] and collaborative release [101][50][51]. [34] then explores the privacy
guarantees in each scenario prior to introduction of differential privacy by Cynthia Dwork
[26][27].
Other than these, trajectory and sequential data publication using k-anonymity can
be broadly classified as follows: generalization [79][89][74], spacial translation [1] and
suppression [17][95]. Research on publishing trajectory data using k-anonymity started
when Nergiz et al. [79] proposed a generalization based approach combined with random reconstruction of the original dataset from anonymization. Spacial translation was
applied by Abul et al.. [1] to publish trajectory data with (k,δ)-anonymity guarantee, which
suggests that since trajectories are uncertain and can be represented in 3D space, each of
the trajectories may have (k − 1) other trajectories with δ nearness. Another approach
was proposed by Chen et al. [17] where they incorporate local and global suppression
to trajectory data. They conclude that local suppression which removes certain instances
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from the dataset provides better utility as compared to global suppression that removes all
the occurrences of the item from the dataset. Other research [37] focuses on publishing
movement data by ensuring LK-privacy. They ensure utility of published data using
probabilistic flow-graph for anonymization.
The distinction between the approaches for publishing movement data are specified in
Table 5.1.

Cao et al. [11]
Fan et al. [30]
Hua et al. [46]
Riboni et al. [85]
Chen et al.[16]
Chen et al. [13]
He et al. [43]
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Nergiz et al. [79]
Sherkat et al. [89]
Abul et al. [1]
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Table 3.1: Comparative evaluation of main features in related privacy-preserving data publishing approaches
(properties in columns are positioned as beneficial with fulfillment denoted by • and non applicability by N/A)
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3.2

Complex Data-Publishing

The discussion so far in all the previous sections has been on reporting data anonymization
and publishing for a single release. While this is crucial, in real-world applications, data
publishing and release are not facile to achieve. That is, the data could be made up
sections that were anonymized separately; and every record of this data may therefore
each have its own  values and different values of noise added. Additionally, the real-world
differentially-private data could be released multiple times with minor changes in the its
records. When publishing such complex data under practical and real-world applications
of data publishing, special attention is needed in the implementation phase based on the
category of data. The following subsections consider such extended publishing scenarios
for complex data publishing [34]. Table 3.2 summarizes the various specifics of these
extended data release scenarios. The three publishing scenarios are discussed in the subsections below. In order to further elaborate, we discuss the techniques used to achieve
those publishing scenarios.

3.2.1

Multiple Data Publishing

During the release of a dataset, said dataset might not be completely required by all the data
miners. Multiple releases can be scheduled by dividing the complete dataset into a number
of smaller dataset views based on what part of the dataset a particular data miner might
be interested in. Such a release can be scheduled by taking the repercussions of partial
data release into consideration. One of the major concerns with such an approach will be
that the attacker could combine these views to obtain more specific data which might have
had not been available previously. Since, in this case, the data publisher will be unable to
foresee or prevent when an attacker obtains more than one view of the dataset. [34]
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Definition 3.2.1. Multiple Data Publishing. Let D be a dataset owned by data owner AD .
For each data release request R by a data miner U, AD publishes a subset dataset DR
satisfying R.



Fung et. al.[34] suggested that privacy is preserved in multiple data releases by anonymizing using k-anonymity and l-diversity approaches. In [26], [7] differential privacy is used
for anonymizing in the case of Multiple data publishing. Barak et al. [7] summates
multiple release issue in differential privacy and the threats the marginals (subsets of the
original dataset) would potentially lead to. Their study provides a formal guarantee for
preserving privacy, accuracy and consistency in the published marginals/subsets. They
propose an approach for maintaining Differential Privacy is a 3 step process where the
dataset is transformed into the Fourier domain. Differential privacy is then applied on the
transformed data, to which linear programming is then applied, to finally obtain a result in
a non-negative contingency table. The application of differential privacy on transformed
data is obtained by perturbation while from the Fourier coefficient values, the resulting
contingency table that consists of no negative values is obtained. The proposed technique
affects neither the accuracy nor the consistency of the dataset during the entire process.
The research in [28] further substantiates the use of contingency tables and marginals
and compares it to histogram data, to determine the noise that will be added to prove the
efficiency of the proposed mechanism.
3.2.2

Incremental Data Publishing

We comprise sequential and continuous data publishing as Incremental data publishing.
In the sequential data-publishing scenario, the data publisher knows the datasets D1 to
Dn−1 that were published previously and would like to publish Dn , where Di is an updated
version of Di−1 . While sequential anonymization presumes that the dataset does not update
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dynamically and remains static throughout, the continuous data publishing on the other
hand presumes that the data updates dynamically with time; this is the major difference
between otherwise similar sequential and continuous anonymization. Another distinction
between sequential and continuous data publishing is that in continuous data publishing all
the data that is published belongs to the same database schema, while all the data that is
released is a projection of the same database in the case of sequential data publishing [34].
Incremental update is similar in meaning to sequential data-publishing, and can be defined
as any update to an existing dataset where each of these updates may differ either on a wide
range or on a very minute scale.
Definition 3.2.2. Incremental Data Publishing Given a dataset D that is continuously
updated, the data owner AD publishes D1 , D2 , ..., Dn such that each published dataset is
an updated version of D.



The paper [34] cites research for achieving sequential and continuous data-publishing
by techniques like k-anonymity, (X,Y)-anonymity, l-diversity and m-invariance. These
techniques, however, are not primarily aimed at differentially-private data. The techniques
for incremental release are published in [86] and [113] with each technique relating to
a different type of data like set-valued data[113], check-in data[86]. [86] presents the
technique for providing differential privacy over check-in data to protect spatio-temporal
data from the untrusted third parties who have access to the data, and from other users who
might infer locations visited by other users, with the help of pre-filtering process. Their
research is further extended for incremental release of this check-in data. [113] proposed
an algorithm IncTDPart for publishing incrementally updating scenario on set-valued data.
This algorithm generates a series of differentially-private releases like in [86]. The algorithm uses Top-down partitioning based on the generated item-free taxonomy tree.
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Table 3.2: Properties of various Complex Data Publishing Scenarios
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Collaborative Data Publishing

The publishing scenarios discussed above considered the data to originate from a single
publisher. Although collaborative data publishing realizes that in real-world scenarios,
there might be cases where multiple publishers are present. In such scenarios, the release
mechanism fails to identify how these multiple publishers interact with each other and
the system on the whole. The interactions can be classified mainly into: multiple data
publishing organizations that share data or subsets of data with other organizations in exchange for their data, multiple publishers that release the data to a Third-party organization
and multiple individuals who individually publish their own record to an organization that
collects data from such varied sources.
Definition 3.2.3. Collaborative Data Publishing Given datasets D1 , D2 , ..., Dn owned by,
the data owners A1 D1 , A2 D2 , ..., An Dn , such that the data owners collaboratively publish
their datasets.



This is discussed further in [90][81][66], where the techniques for collaborative release
are portrayed. The paper [90] considers untrusted aggregator to learn over multiple participant’s data in a differentially-private manner. The proposed technique that lets a group
of participants to upload a sequence of encrypted data values to the aggregator. Which
in turn, permits the aggregator to summate all the values uploaded in a time period, but
does not provide the aggregator permission to be able to learn anything else from the data
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values. Although this might not directly be a data publishing scenario, [90] demonstrates
how a collaborative scenario works. [81] presents a technique that can be used by a
third party organization as per the scenarios listed above. They propose a combination of
differential privacy and secret sharing in the same system for protecting the privacy of data
publishers with the privacy of individuals whose records might be in the data. Differing
in the number of publishers and data miners, [66] presented a technique for secure data
exchange between two parties where both parties act as a data publishers and the joint data
is made differentially-private while preserving the privacy of both datasets.

3.3

Privacy Preserving Data Mining

Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) is another related field for data sharing which
focuses on mining information from a shared data. While mining, the privacy of the entities
involved needs to be maintained and not be disclosed to the data miner who may also be
an adversary. The goal of PPDM is to preserve the privacy while mining from the dataset.
There has been vast literature [3][4][5][48] for data mining while preserving the privacy of
data, which has been discussed in detail in the survey [2][62] by Agarwal et al. and [97] by
Verykios et al..
Distributed privacy-preserving data mining (DPPDM) is a decentralized version of
PPDM where multiple parties are involved in the process of data mining on distributed data.
Over the past years, there has been vast research [19][62] on distributed data mining. We
refer the reader to [2] for in depth discussion about the literature on PPDM and DPPDM.
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Chapter 4

PROPOSED ALGORITHM

We propose a solution for publishing trajectory data in a differentially-private manner. We
apply partitioning to generalize the timestamp occurrences in the original doublets in order
to generate differentially-private doublets and therefore differentially-private trajectories.
Partitioning is applied over timestamps that occurred at the location.
Distinct timestamps that exist for each location in the trajectory data is initially represented as a cluster. Next, each of these clusters containing timestamps are subdivided
into 2len(clus)−1 partition-cases to further generalize the existing timestamps based on the
obtained partitioning results. The score of each of these partitioning-cases are generated
based on the utility function we introduce. Based on the utility score, each partitioning-case
is sampled using exponential mechanism, and the newly generated timestamp becomes the
representative of the previously existing timestamps in the partitioning-case. Next, for all
locations, we generate new trajectories by replacing the actual timestamps in the original
data. To achieve differential privacy before publishing the data, Laplace noise is added to
the count of newly generated trajectories.
In Figure 4.2.(a), we portray an example in which a location cluster consisting of 3
unique timestamps, where timestamps 1 and 7 are repeated 2 times each. We demonstrate
all the possible partitioning-cases (2n−1 ) for this cluster. In the figure, Internal (<- ->) and
External (↔) number of Gaps and number of occurrences of Gaps are represented.
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Case 1:

L1

1(2)

Case 2:

1(2)

Case 3:

1(2)

3(1)
3(1)

7(2)
7(2)

1
1

3

7

3(1)

7(2)

7

Case 4:
(a)

1(2)

3(1)

7(2)

(b)

Figure 4.1: (a) original cluster for 3 unique timestamps with different counts and (b)
possible partitioning-cases (2n−1 = 4) for this cluster, and Internal (<- ->) and External
(↔) number of Gaps and number of occurrences of Gaps

Our initial approach for partitioning the timestamps was highly dependent on the number of timestamps that exist in the cluster. This led to an infeasible number of partitioning
cases.
Example 4.0.1. If we have a cluster of 20 timestamps at a given location, our approach
will partition these timestamps and generate 220−1 partitioning cases. And if we have 50
different locations each having 20 timestamps, we need to generate 50 ∗ 219 = 26214400
partitioning cases over which we need to calculate utility and input into exponential mechanism.



To overcome this problem, we introduce a differentially-private sub-algorithm which
incorporates differential privacy on existing timestamps at each location in order to choose
the best θ pivot ranges, where θ is the number of pivots and is equal to size ofαcluster (α varies
from 2 to 10). We begin by generating disjoint ranges for these timestamps, such that each
range is represented by the count of timestamps within that range. By applying exponential
mechanism, we choose the top θ pivot points based on the counts of these ranges, where
a higher count represents better utility. Once these pivot points are determined, we apply
a greedy approach to generate disjoint partitions including all timestamps before the pivot.
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TL = <t1, t2, t3, t4, t5>

Lany

Generate Pivot exp(Ɛ/3)

PivotL = <t2, t4>

Lany

Generate Ranges

PRangesL = <(0, t2], (t2, t4]>

Lany

Generate Clusters

{Clus1, Clus2} = <t1, t2>, <t3, t4, t5>

Lany

For each cluster

Clus1 = <t1, t2>

Lany

Generate 2|Clus1|-1 partitioning cases

PC1 = {{t1} {t2}}

Clus2 = <t3, t4, t5>

Generate 2|Clus2|-1 partitioning cases

PC1 = {{t3} {t4} {t5}}

PC2 = {t1, t2}

PC2 = {{t3, t4} {t5}}

PC3 = {{t3} {t4 ,t5}}

PC4 = {t3, t4 ,t5}

Use exp(2Ɛ/3) to determine winning partition

Use exp(2Ɛ/3) to determine winning partition
PC = {{t1} {t2}}

Lany

Lany

PC = {{t3, t4} {t5}}

Lany

Combine winning timestamps
T = < {t1} {t2} {t3, t4} {t5} >

Lany

Figure 4.2: The process of generating pivot timestamps and partitioning

For the last pivot, all timestamps after will be included. Our algorithm is then incorporated
on these partition cases for each pivot individually, thus drastically reducing the number of
partitioning cases generated.
Example 4.0.2. Given a cluster of 20 timestamps, at a certain location our approach will
generate 10 pivot elements, which if distributed evenly in the cluster would mean that
approximately 22−1 ∗ 10 = 20 partition cases are generated. If we have 50 locations, each
of which having 20 timestamps, and they all have pivot elements distributed evenly through
the cluster, the we need to generate 20 ∗ 50 = 1000 partitioning cases throughout.



This proves that our sub algorithm makes the partitioning process more feasible while
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maintaining the differential privacy guarantee.

4.1

Solution Overview

The flow of our proposed approach is depicted in the pipeline diagram in Figure 4.3.
The first step is Data Collection (not shown in pipeline diagram), during which the data
owners contribute their data to build the raw trajectory dataset. The privacy-preserving data
publishing process begins by preprocessing (cleaning, proper formatting) the raw trajectory
data. Next, exponential mechanism is applied in Phase 1, which includes generation of
pivot timestamps and partitioning. Next, in Phase 2, Laplace mechanism is used to add
noisy values to the real count of each trajectory in the raw data. From the differentiallyprivate anonymizer, the differentially-private trajectory data is published. The trajectory
data published using our approach is suitable for count queries, range queries, and mining
frequent sequential patterns.

Exponential
Mechanism

Laplace
Mechanism

Our Contribution

Data Miners

Count Query
Pivot generation
(Algorithm 2)

Raw
Trajectory
Dataset

Preprocessing

Partitioning
(Algorithm 3, 4)
Phase 1

Noisy count
generation
(Algorithm 5)

Phase 2

Range Query
Differentially
Private
Trajectory
Dataset
Frequent
Sequential Pattern
Mining

DP Anonymizer

Privacy Preserving Data Publishing

Figure 4.3: Pipeline diagram of our proposed approach

Query Answering
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Next, we provide an overview of the proposed algorithms. The main algorithm 1 begins
by generating clusters of timestamps at each unique location, and then executes algorithm 2
to determine the winning partitioning case out of numerous possibilities. A representative
value is then sampled from each partition within winning partitioning cases at each location.
Next, after regenerating the trajectories, we add Laplace noise to the real counts of these
trajectories before publishing the differentially-private trajectory data. The main algorithm
calls upon the cluster generation algorithm 2 in step 2 for each cluster Tlj at location
lj using half of the privacy budget. The cluster generation algorithm uses exponential
mechanism for generating the initial partitions of the cluster and further generates a set of
ordered clusters, based on the pivot ranges generated using threshold θ. This algorithm
calls algorithm 3 for determining the winning partition for each cluster of timestamps, to
return the winning partitioning case to algorithm 1.
When algorithm 3 is called by the cluster generation algorithm, each cluster clusi
in CL is input with the privacy budget 2/3. The algorithm 3 generates all possible
partitioning cases for the cluster clusi and computes utility score of each partitioning
case using the utility metrics we propose in algorithm 4. Based on these utility scores,
exponential mechanism is then used to determine the winning partitioning case pcw , which
is returned to algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 is called by algorithm 3, where the partitioning case pc is the input, and the
algorithm returns the computed utility for pc based on the properties of the timestamps and
partitions in the partition case. These properties include: (i) the gaps between timestamps
which is computed by the difference between adjacent timestamps, (ii) the CountGaps
between timestamps which is the difference between the number of occurrences of adjacent timestamps, (iii) the gaps between partitions which is the difference between the
last and first timestamp of two adjacent partitions respectively. The algorithm computes
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the External Homogeneity which is the homogeneity between partitions and the Internal
Homogeneity, which is the homogeneity between timestamps within partitions for all partitions using Standard Deviation. Finally, the algorithm computes the utility score Upc
which is returned to algorithm 3.
For adding Laplace noise, the main Algorithm 1 calls Algorithm 5 over the generalized
dataset D0 using privacy budget . This will add noise to the number of occurrences of the
generalized trajectories T 0 in D0 . Then Algorithm 5 adds Lap() to the real count of each
trajectory T 0 ∈ D0 . The differentially-private data D̂ must be then generated as per the
noisy counts of the trajectories, and D̂ is returned to the main algorithm 1, which publishes
the differentially-private data D̂.

4.2

Algorithms

In this section, we discuss our algorithms in detail for publishing trajectory data while
guaranteeing differential privacy. Algorithm 1 is the main algorithm that inputs the raw
trajectory dataset D and returns differentially-private dataset D̂. This algorithm calls upon
other algorithms 2 and 5 for cluster generation and addition of Laplace noise to the real
count of trajectories, respectively. The algorithms 3 and 4 are called by algorithm 2 for
determining the winning partitioning case and computing the utility score for determining
the winning partitioning cases, respectively.
The main algorithm 1 comprises of all major steps for publishing differentially-private
trajectory data. This algorithm calls upon other algorithms 2 and 5 at different steps to
accomplish their necessary functions. It begins with the generation of all clusters Tl for
each location l ∈ L currently present in the raw data D. Within these clusters, there might
be one or more occurrences of a timestamp t ∈ Tl . The second step in this algorithm
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Algorithm 1 Main algorithm to generate differentially-private trajectories
Differentially-Private Trajectory Data Generation
Input: Trajectory dataset D = {T1 , . . . , Tn }, privacy budget B
Output: Differentially-private trajectory dataset D̂
1. Given raw dataset D, determine the set of unique locations: L = {l1 , . . . , lm },
and for each location l ∈ L, determine the cluster Tl of all timestamps corresponding to that location. Note that any timestamp t ∈ Tl might have multiple
occurrences.
2. For each location lj ∈ L:
(a) Execute algorithm 2 on Tlj using privacy budget B/2 to determine the best
partitioning case of Tlj in a differentially-private manner. The result is a set
of timestamp partitions (intervals) Plj = {Plj ,1 , . . . , Plj ,|Plj | }.
(b) From each partition Plj ,i ∈ Plj : 1 ≤ i ≤ |Plj |, we uniformly sample a
value vi to be the representative timestamp of Plj ,i .
3. Generate D0 from D such that for each trajectory T ∈ D there is a corresponding
trajectory T 0 ∈ D0 , and each timestamp t in every doublet in T is generalized.
That is, for each doublet d(l, t) ∈ T , add doublet d0 (l, v) to T 0 , where v is the
representative timestamp of t at location l.
4. Execute algorithm 5 over generalized dataset D0 using the remaining privacy
budget B/2 in order to add Laplace noise to real counts of trajectories and
therefore generate differentially-private trajectory data D̂.
5. Return differentially-private trajectory dataset D̂.

calls Algorithm 2 for each location lj ∈ L on the cluster Tlj using half of the assigned
privacy budget B, in order to determine the best partitioning case for Tlj while guaranteeing
differential privacy. This returns a set of timestamp partitions Plj . For each location
lj ∈ L, a set of representative timestamps vi are uniformly sampled from each timestamp
partition Plj ,i ∈ Plj . The next step of this algorithm generates generalized trajectories
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T 0 ∈ D0 for each trajectory T ∈ D, such that, for each doublet d(l, t) ∈ T , a generalized
doublet d0 (l, v) ∈ T 0 is added where v is the representative timestamp of t at the location l.
The fourth step in algorithm 1 calls upon algorithm 5 over the generalized dataset D0
using the remaining half of the privacy budget B for addition of Laplace noise to the real
count of each trajectory T 0 ∈ D0 to generate differentially-private trajectory data D̂. This
differentially-private data D̂ can then be published for data mining and analysis.
Algorithm 2 Choosing differentially-private partitions by exponential mechanism
Partition Generation
Input: Cluster of timestamps T = {t1 , . . . , t|T | }, privacy budget 
Output: Differentially-private partitioning multiset P
1. Compute the score of each timestamp ti ∈ T by applying exponential mechanism
on (ti , Occ(ti )) using /3 of the privacy budget, where ti ∈ T and Occ(ti ) is the
occurrence of ti in T :
EM (ti , Occti ) = P

/3
(Occ(ti ))
exp 2∆Occ

tj ∈T

/3
exp 2∆Occ
(Occ(tj ))

(4.1)

2. Choose top θ timestamps from previous step as the pivot timestamps: P T =
hpt1 , . . . , ptθ i, where θ = |T |/α, and pti < pti+1 : 1 ≤ i < θ and α can range
from 2 to 10.
3. Generate a set of ordered clusters CL = hclus1 , . . . , clusθ i over P T , where each
cluster clusi ⊆ CL represents the range (pti−1 , pti ] and pt0 = 0.
4. For each cluster clusi ∈ CL:
(a) Assign each timestamp tj ∈ T to clusi if tj is within the range (pti−1 , pti ].
(b) Using the remaining privacy budget 2/3, partition clusi in a differentiallyprivate manner using algorithm 3, and add the winning partitioning case to
P.
5. Return P .

43
The main algorithm calls upon the partition generation algorithm in step 2, for each
cluster of timestamps T at location lj ∈ L to result in a differentially-private partitioning
multi-set P . The fist step computes the score of each timestamp ti ∈ T having an occurrence of Occti via exponential mechanism EM(ti ,Occti ) using one-thirds of the alloted
privacy budget (see Equation 4.2). This results in timestamps that resulted the best score
(while maintaining differential privacy). The second step stores such timestamps as pivot
timestamps ptx ∈ P T , where x can range from 1 to θ. Here the value of θ is |T |/α, but
in the Chapter 5 we experiment on different values of α between 2 to 10. In the next step,
the algorithm generates a set of ordered clusters clusx ∈ CL for each ptx ∈ P T , such that
that cluster clusi represents all timestamps that may exist in the range (pti−1 , pti ] with an
exception of pt0 = 0.
Now for each cluster clusi ∈ CL, each timestamp tj ∈ T is assigned to cluster clusi
if the timestamp tj is within the range of (pti−1 , pti ]. Algorithm 3 is then called upon each
partition clusi ∈ CL using remaining two-thirds of the assigned privacy budget . This
algorithm returns the winning partitioning case pcw which is added to the differentiallyprivate partitioning multi-set P . The algorithm returns P to main algorithm 1.
To determine the winning partition for each clusi ∈ CL, Algorithm 3 is called upon
by Algorithm 2 using the assigned privacy budget  for this task. The first step generates
all possible partitioning cases P C = pc1 , . . . , pcm for the cluster clusi ∈ CL, where
m = 2|clusi |−1 . The generation of these partitioning cases are discussed with an example
in Figure 4. The second step calls upon Algorithm 4 for computing the utility score
ui for each partitioning case pci ∈ P C. Exponential mechanism EM(pci , ui ) is then
applied, using the privacy budget  for determining the partitioning case having high scores
(see Equation 4.2). Such partitioning case sampled from the scores generated from the
EM (pc , ui ) is the winning partitioning case pcw . This winning partitioning case pcw is
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Algorithm 3 Choosing differentially-private partitions by exponential mechanism
Determining the winning partitioning case
Input: Cluster of timestamps clus, privacy budget 
Output: Winning partitioning case pcw
1. Generate all possible partitioning cases P C = {pc1 , . . . , pcm } from cluster clus,
where m = 2|clus|−1 .
2. For each partitioning case pci ∈ P C, compute the utility score ui of pci using
algorithm 4.
3. Using privacy budget , apply exponential mechanism on (pci , ui ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m to
determine the winning partitioning case pcw by sampling from the EM (pci , ui )
scores:

(ui )
exp 2∆u
(4.2)
EM (pci , ui ) = P

pcj ∈clus exp 2∆u (uj )
4. Return pcw .

returned to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 4 is used to compute the utility score Up c for each partitioning case pc =
{p1 , . . . , pk }. The concept of external gaps and internal gaps are described in Figure 4.
The first step computes the External Gap Homogeneity (EGH) using Standard Deviation
(SD) on external gaps, between adjacent partitions in pc using Equation 4.3. In the next
step, compute External CountGap Homogeneity (EGH Occ ) using Standard Deviation (SD)
on the difference between size of each partition |pi | using Equation 4.4. Using EGH and
EGH Occ , we compute the External Homogeneity (EH) as in Equation 4.5.
Next, the algorithm computes the Internal Gap Homogeneity (IGH) using Standard
Deviation on the internal gaps between the distinct and adjacent timestamps for each partition pi ∈ pc using Equation 4.6. We next compute the Internal CountGap Homogeneity
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Algorithm 4 Equations to compute utility of a partitioning case
Utility Score Computation
Input: Partitioning case: pc = {p1 , . . . , pk }
Output: Utility score Upc
1. Compute External Homogeneity (EH) using External Gap Homogeneity (EGH) and External CountGap Homogeneity
(EGH Occ ):
(a) Calculate External Gap Homogeneity (EGH) using the Standard Deviation on external gaps between adjacent
partitions in pc to determine the overall variance:
EGH =

SD

1≤i≤k−1

(pi+1 [tf irst ] − pi [tlast ])

(4.3)

where tf irst and tlast are the first and last timestamps in a partition px .
(b) Next, calculate the External CountGap Homogeneity (EGH Occ ) using Standard Deviation on the difference
between size of each partition pi ∈ pc:
EGH Occ =

SD

1≤i≤k−1

(|hi+1 − hi |)

(4.4)

where hi is the number of timestamps in partition pi .
(c) Compute the External Homogeneity (EH) as:
EH = EGH × EGH Occ

(4.5)

2. Compute Internal Homogeneity (EH) using Internal Gap Homogeneity (EGH) and Internal CountGap Homogeneity
(EGH Occ ):
(a) Calculate the Internal Gap Homogeneity (IGH) using the Standard Deviation on internal gaps between distinct
adjacent timestamps for each partition pi ∈ pc to determine the amount of variation across it:

IGH =

i=k
X
i=1

SD

1≤j≤hi −1

(|pi [tj+1 ] − pi [tj ]|)

(4.6)

where hi is the number of timestamps in partition pi .
(b) Next, calculate the Internal CountGap Homogeneity (IGH Occ ) using Standard Deviation on the difference
between number of occurrences of distinct adjacent timestamps in each partition pi ∈ pc:

IGH Occ =

i=k
X
i=1

SD

1≤j≤hi −1

|Occ(pi [tj+1 ]) − Occ(pi [tj ])| : pi [tj+1 ] 6= pi [tj ]

(4.7)

where p0i is the modified partition pi which contains distinct timestamps from pi and has length li , and
Occ(p0i [tj ]) is the number of occurrences of timestamp p0i [tj ] in pi .
(c) Compute the Internal Homogeneity (IH) as:
IH = IGH × IGH Occ

(4.8)

3. Calculate the final Utility Score Upc using the external and internal homogeneities EH and IH computed in Steps 1 and
2:
EH
Upc =
(4.9)
IH
4. Return Upc .
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Algorithm 5 Applying Laplace noise to the original counts of generalized trajectory data
Addition of Laplace Noise
Input: Dataset D0 , privacy budget 
Output: Differentially-private trajectory data D̂
1. For each trajectory Ti ∈ D0 , add Laplace noise Lap() to the real count of Ti :
OccTi , using the privacy budget .
2. Append each trajectory Ti based on its noisy count Occ0Ti to dataset D̂.
3. Return differentially-private trajectory data D̂

(IGH Occ ) between the number of occurrences of distinct and adjacent timestamps for each
partition pi ∈ pc, using 4.7. Next the algorithm computes the Internal Homogeneity (IH)
using Equation 4.8.

In the final step, this algorithm computes the Utility Score (Upc ) using the computed
EH and IH in the previous steps. Algorithm 4 returns the computed Upc to algorithm 3
for each partitioning case pc.

The main algorithm 1 calls upon the algorithm 5 over each trajectory T 0 in the generalized dataset D0 , using the remaining half of the total privacy budget  = B/2. For each
trajectory Ti ∈ D0 , Laplace noise Lap() is added to its real count OccTi to generate noisy
count Occ0Ti . After the noise is added to each trajectory in the generalized dataset D0 to
generate differentially-private dataset D̂0 .
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4.3

Complexity Analysis

We denote by n the number of trajectories and by d the number of doublets in a dataset.
We can determine the time complexity of the proposed approach in terms of these two
notations. Our proposed approach broadly comprises of two main phases: (Phase 1)
generating pivot timestamps and partitioning via exponential mechanism and (Phase 2)
addition of Laplace noise to counts.
The computation for Phase 1 without generating pivot timestamps originally had a time
complexity of O(2(t−1) ) where t is the number of timestamps originally in the cluster. This
led to the introduction of generation of pivot timestamps which reduced the time complexity
of by subdividing the timestamps prior to partitioning. We compute the number of pivot
timestamps θ =

|T |
,
α

where |T | is the number of timestamps originally in the cluster. The

generation of this pivots led to the generation of sub-clusters each of which is of size ' α.
This reduces the time needed for generation of partitions to O(θ ∗ 2(α−1) ) where θ is the
number of pivot timestamps and α is the size of each pivot. Therefore, for all locations in
the dataset, the time complexity for Phase 1 is O(|L| ∗ θ ∗ 2(α−1) ), where |L| represents the
number of distinct locations in the dataset. This can be simplified by the knowledge that
the value of α is between 2 to 10, thus 2(α−1) is bounded by a constant. Also, we know
that |L| ∗ θ ≤ d. Therefore the total time complexity for Phase 1 is O(d).
The next step before Phase 2 is the regeneration of generalized trajectories which has
the time complexity of O(d).
Phase 2 comprises of the addition of Laplace noise to the real counts of each raw
trajectory in the generalized data. This phase therefore has a total time complexity of
O(n ∗ k), where n = |T | represents the number of trajectories and k is the time needed for
adding noise to one trajectory (k is constant).
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Thus the total time complexity for our proposed approach is O(n + d), where n represents the number of trajectories and d represents the number of doublets in the data.
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Chapter 5

EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION

In this chapter, we discuss the implementaion of our algorithms, including the datasets
used and the experiemental evaluation over the generated differentially-private data. More
specifically, we discuss scalability, efficiency and utility, as well as the complexity of the
approach. The implementation for our solution has been done in Python 2.7 on a Linux
machine with Intel Xeon(R) CPU E5-1620 v4 @ 3.50GHz Processor.

5.1

Datasets

We implement our approach on two datasets of taxi trajectories, whose features are listed
in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Properties of Datasets we performed experiments
Dataset
goTrack
TDrive

# of doublets
18,107
10,158,088

# of locations
8,394
97,822

# of trajectories
163
8,890

The first dataset on which we evaluate the performance of our approach is GPS Trajectories Dataset [21]. This dataset is composed of two tables: go track tracks.csv and
go track trackspoints.csv where go track tracks.csv has general attributes and each instance
owns trajectory in the go track trackspoints.csv dataset. This dataset contains about 18,000
doublets. Another dataset that we use to evaluate the scalability and performance of our

50
proposed approach is TDrive dataset [110] [111]. It contains more than 10 million doublets
of (location, timestamp) for the trajectories of taxis in Beijing. The original format of
this dataset is ”taxi id, datetime, longitude, latitude”. Through our experiments over
both datasets, we consider each unique ”longitude, latitude” pair as unique locations and
”datetime” pair as timestamp. A pair of such (location, timestamp) is called a doublet.

5.2

Experimental Results

We evaluate the performance of our approach by implementing the proposed solution over
the datasets for the following metrics : scalability, efficiency and utility.

5.2.1

Scalability

We set up our experiments to test the scalability of our approach on the TDrive dataset.
We measure the runtime (RT) with respect to linear increase in # of doublets and # of
trajectories, while setting the value of privacy budget  to 1. We also set α, the parameter determining the number of pivots, to 3. Figure 5.1.a illustrates the when the # of
doublets increases linearly from 1, 000, 000 to 5, 000, 000, while Figure 5.1.b illustrates
the runtime when # of trajectories has a linear growth from 1, 000 to 8, 000, assuming
that the maximum trajectory length is 20. We observe from Figures 5.1.a and 5.1.b that
the total runtime of our algorithm grows linearly when the data size (# of doublets or
# of trajectories) increases linearly. We also observe that Phase1 (generating pivots and
partitioning) is the dominating phase compared to Phase2 (generating noisy trajectories);
however, they both scales linearly w.r.t data size.
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(a) Growth of data (number of doublets)

(b) Growth of data (number of trajectories)

Figure 5.1: Scalability w.r.t. (a) linear growth of number of doublets, and (b) linear growth
of number of trajectories.
5.2.2

Efficiency

We evaluate the efficiency of our proposed approach on the TDrive dataset with respect to
privacy budget- and number of pivot timestamps α. Figure 5.2.a illustrates the average
runtime obtained over 10 cycles when the value of  is increased between 0.25 to 1.5 at an
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(a) Privacy budget 

(b) Pivot timestamps α

Figure 5.2: Efficiency w.r.t. (a) privacy budget , and (b) size of pivot timestamps α,
averaged over 10 cycles.
interval of 0.25. We observe that the runtime remains consistent (around 1525 sec) until 
is equal to 1, and then starts increasing with a sudden spike to 1610 when the value of 
reaches 1.25. This anomaly is due to the fact that generated pivots are typically not evenly
spaced out within the cluster, resulting in more than usual runtime needed for Phase-1,
which includes partitioning. Given that the level of noise reduces when the the value of
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 grows, we conclude from Figure 5.2.a that the optimal value of  to balance between
efficiency and privacy is 1. Figure 5.2.b illustrates the the average runtime obtained over
10 cycles when the value of α increases from 2 to 8 with an interval value of 2. We observe
that as α increases, the runtime increases accordingly (from 1,524 seconds for α = 2 to
1,565 seconds for α = 8). As a result, we conclude that the lower α is, the better our
algorithm performs.

5.2.3

Utility

Utility is the usability of the output data compared to the original one. The higher the
privacy of the published data is, the lower its utility. In this section, we measure the utility of
the anonymized (differentially-private) published data with respect to count queries, range
queries, and frequent sequential pattern mining. We measure the utility of the output data
for count queries by counting the number of trajectories in which certain randomly-chosen
locations exist in raw data D and output differentially-private data D̂. The error rate (query
distortion) is then computed as follows [47]:

relative error / error rate =

|Q(D̂) − Q(D)|
max(Q(D̂), Q(D))

(5.1)

where Q(D) and Q(D̂) represent the output of count queries on raw data D and anonymous data D̂, respectively.

Count Queries
The count queries we set up for our experiments on the differentially-private dataset are
queried over a predetermined number of locations. The number of locations on which the
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.3: Error rate of anonymized data, where α = 2, and MaxQ is set to 3, 6, 9 and 12.

count query Q1 asks queries, is a random that ranges between the previous value of M axQ
and current M axQ.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the change in error rate as the value of the privacy budget  grows
from 0.25 to 1.5 at an interval 0.25, where the number of pivots α is set to 2 and MaxQ is
set to 3, 6, 9 and 12. The experimental results are generated using both datasets: goTrack
and TDrive. We observe that error rate ranges between 25% to 75%, but decreases with
the increase of  with respect to both datasets. We also observe that as the value of MaxQ
increases, indicating an increase in the number of locations for which the dataset is queried,
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 5.4: Error rate of anonymized data, where α = 4, and MaxQ is set to 3, 6, 9 and 12.

the overall error rate goes down. The worst case error in figure-(a) when MaxQ = 3 is
almost 75% whereas, the worst case error in figure-(b) when MaxQ = 2 is almost 60%. The
highest utility (lowest error rate), i.e. 25% for goTrack dataset and 30% for TDrive dataset,
is reached when  = 1.25 and MaxQ is 6, 9 or 12. Overall, We notice that the pattern of
changes in error rate rate is consistent for both the datasets w.r.t. privacy budget .
Almost similar conclusions about error rate rate can be obtained from Figure 5.4, where
privacy budget  grows from 0.25 to 1.5 at an interval 0.25, the number of pivots α is set to
4 and MaxQ is set to 3, 6, 9 and 12. This indicates that unlike  and MaxQ, changes in the
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number of pivots α do not have a direct impact on the utility of the output data with respect
to count queries.

Range Queries
Each range query includes a range of locations within the predetermined radius from the
randomly selected location from the dataset. This query results in the count of trajectories
having one or more of the locations from this range, based on the type of range query. We
have queried using 2 types of range queries: possibly sometime inside (PSI) and definitely
always inside (DAI) [46]. A PSI range query represents the count of trajectories that exist
when a doublet from the range of (location, timestamp) doublets exists within the radius
of a random location. On the other hand, a DAI Range Query represents the count of
trajectories such that all the doublets in the trajectory exist from the range of doublets in
the query.
We use Hausdroff distance [75] to compute the distance between doublets and determine the locations that are within the said radius of given location. We utilize the algorithm
to compute Hausdroff distance from [38]. The result of a range query is the count of
trajectories. We therefore query over the raw data D and the anonymized data D̂ to generate
resulting Q2 (D) and Q2 (D̂), respectively. These results are then used to compute the error
rate according to Equation 5.1.
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the results obtained in terms of the change in error rate for
TDrive dataset when the value of  and α linearly grow, and the radius is set to 0.5. The
range query used is PSI, which means there should be at least one doublet in the trajectory
is the same as the specified range in the query, which means that the locations are within
the Radius = 0.5. In the chart, we notice that the error rate from the range query reduces as
the value of  grows. Also, the error rate slightly flickers but generally reduces as the value
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Figure 5.5: Error rate across different α and  values for PSI range queries for TDrive
Dataset where radius = 0.5.
of α increases. Since α is used for determining the number of pivot timestamps to reduce
the complexity of partitioning, the conclusion that utility is not adversely affected by the
change of the value of α is good. The worst case error occurs when both α and  have the
lowest values. The best case (about 30%) occurs when  ≥ 1 with not much change in α.
Figure 5.6 demonstrates the result obtained in terms of change in error rate for TDrive
dataset for growing values of α and  while the radius here is 1.0 using PSI range queries.
We observe that the error rate reduces when the value of  grows. Also, the error rate
reduces slightly as α increases with some flicker in the values.

Frequent Sequential Pattern Mining
Another set of experiments we have performed to test the utility of the differentially-private
published dataset using our proposed approach is Frequent Sequential Pattern Mining.
Since our approach is specifically for publishing trajectory data, determining the utility

58

Figure 5.6: Error rate across different α and  values for PSI range queries for TDrive
Dataset where radius = 1.0.
of the differentially-private sequences by computing the error generated relative to the
occurrences of those sequences in the raw dataset. The error rate is computed on the
counts of frequent sequences that are beyond a threshold of M inimumSupport on the
raw dataset-D and differentially-private dataset-D̂. This results in the counts of frequently
occurring sequences-Q3 (D) and Q3 (D̂) for raw and differentially-private dataset. We then
compute the error rate between Q3 (D) and Q3 (D̂) using the formula-5.1.
In figure 5.7, we demonstrate the results obtained from mining the frequent sequential
patterns on real and noisy goTrack trajectories dataset to generate error rate. For our
experiments, we maintain a constant value for the privacy budget- at the optimum value
of 1.25 and a MinimumSupport of 20%. The value of α grows from 2 to 10 with an interval
of 2. We can see that the error rate reduces between 60% to 63% when α grows between 2
to 8. The error rate reduces to about 40% when α is 10. We expected this behavior since
α determines the number of pivot timestamps, thus determining the the randomness added
due to exponential mechanism while partitioning. That is, the greater the value of α, the
less is the number of pivot timestamps. This increases the utility but affects the computation
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Figure 5.7: Error rate across different α values for frequent sequences over TDrive Dataset.
time adversely.
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Chapter 6

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

6.1

Summary

As information exchange is becoming an integral component for communication among
individuals, companies and government organizations, it has become essential to maintain
a safe framework for data exchange. In this thesis, we thoroughly review recent research
pertaining to privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) via differential privacy, and propose a robust algorithm for publishing trajectory data in a differentially-private manner that
is suitable for count queries, range queries, and frequent sequential pattern mining.
In Chapter 2 we first discuss the preliminaries for movement data. We define and
discuss differential privacy and its variations, and the mechanisms to achieve differential
privacy. We then present the difference between privacy-preserving data publishing and
other interactive privacy-preserving frameworks.
In Chapter 3, we review, discuss and compare existing techniques for achieving differential privacy. Most of these techniques consider single publishing by a single trusted data
publisher and therefore apply differential privacy for the first release to the first recipient.
We have also assessed and discussed other possible data publishing scenarios and works
that have proposed techniques for publishing data for such complex scenarios, including
multiple publishing, incremental publishing and collaborative data publishing.
In Chapter 4, we proposed a novice technique for publishing trajectory movement data
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that utilizes differential privacy to guarantee the privacy of the individuals involved in the
data, while maintaining the utility of the published data. We propose several algorithms
to compute various steps of achieving differential privacy on the trajectory data. Our
approach maintains high utility by adjusting the value of the privacy budget , calibrating a
co-efficient α for determining the number pivot timestamps generated.
In Chapter 5, we examined the performance of our approach in terms of scalability,
efficiency and utility. From the experimental results, we concluded that our approach is
scalable, efficient and provides good utility for count queries, range queries and mining
frequent sequential patterns.
In a nutshell, the main contribution of this thesis is to propose an algorithm for publishing trajectory data in a differentially-private manner, while guaranteeing scalability,
efficiency and utility of the published data.

6.2

Looking Ahead

One future work is to utilize the distance between locations and incorporate that as a consistency constraint when generalizing trajectories. This will limit possibility of occurrence
of locations in trajectories that might never occur at that sequence. In turn, it would further
enhance the accuracy of the differentially-private published data.
We know that the real count of trajectories in the raw dataset is not equal to the generated noisy count in the differentially-private dataset using our proposed approach. This
affects the utility of the published dataset; The count queries and range queries do not
seem to face adverse effect due to this. However, when frequent sequential patterns are
mined, the noise added increases the size of the differentially-private dataset as compared
to the raw dataset. These increased numbers of trajectories in the published dataset seem
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to adversely affect the utility of the published data when frequent sequential patterns are
mined. Therefore, another future work is investigate how to ensure that the size of the
anonymized output data is at the same order of the raw data.
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